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Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to examine organizational secrecy. This is a topic for which historical analysis is uniquely well-suited. Studying organizational secrecy presents severe methodological problems for the obvious reason that that which is secret is inaccessible to researchers (Greve, Palmer & Posner, 2010: 69). This, no doubt, accounts for the fact that secrets and secrecy in organizations have been very rarely studied (Jones, 2008). To the extent that secrets have a ‘life-cycle’, that is, at some point they cease to be secrets any more, historical analysis is virtually the only way of studying them.
Studies not just of secrets in organizations, but of organizations whose operations are themselves secret, such as state intelligence agencies, are even more difficult, presenting almost insuperable legal barriers. Yet they are of particular significance in that they offer, in fairly pure form, cases where pervasive organizational cultures of secrecy may be found. This is of interest both intrinsically but also because it may shed light upon the more routine cases of organizational secrecy, such as those relating to products (i.e. trade secrets) and strategies which have occasionally been studied in the organizational literature (e.g. Hall, 1992; Liebeskind, 1997; Maurer & Zugelder, 2000). To the extent that such agencies have been studied, this has been by intelligence historians working with publicly available, declassified materials (Davies, 2004; Aldrich, 2010), or with classified material by virtue of having been commissioned to write official histories (e.g. Andrew, 2009; Jeffery, 2010), or both (e.g. Hinsley, 1993). The case examined here, that of the Government Code and Cypher School (GC & CS) during its tenure at Bletchley Park (BP) in World War Two (WW2) has been almost entirely declassified and has been the subject of a major study over several years (Grey, 2012, 2013; Sturdy & Grey 2008, 2009, 2010).
The study had as its main source of primary data archival material. With the near complete declassification of the papers relating to BP, these are available at the United Kingdom’s National Archives (TNA) in Kew, London​[1]​. They run to several tens of thousands of pages of text and are enormously varied in character and interest, encompassing routine memorandums, minutes of meetings, detailed reports on operational and strategic matters and much else besides. Of particular importance are a number of internal histories compiled towards the end of and just after the war. These were not intended for public consumption, although have now mostly been declassified, and are lengthy volumes (in some cases multiple volumes) containing a wealth of material. 
In addition to archive sources, six BP veterans were interviewed for this study and material from these interviews is referred to in this paper (using pseudonyms) simply as a way of providing more vivid and personalised accounts to illustrate themes from the archive. Moreover, the large and growing number of published reminiscences of those who worked at BP are referred to. It should be emphasised that both the archive and other materials demonstrate that the culture, or cultures, of BP was of considerable complexity (see Grey, 2012: 107-172) and it is not the task of this paper to explore this. Instead, one particular element of BP culture, that of secrecy, is the focus.
 The paper proceeds as follows. In the first section, there is a brief overview of BP provided in order to give sufficient contextual information for the second, main, section of the paper to make sense. This main section of the paper examines BP as case of an organizational culture of secrecy, explaining how it worked. The concluding discussion suggests how this case relates to the wider phenomenon of organizational secrecy and especially the formation of group identities and the potential problems of lack of organizational communication.
Overview of Bletchley Park
Bletchley Park was the location selected to house GC & CS during WW2. GC & CS had been formed in 1919 (see Davies, 2001 for details) through the merger of Army and Naval cryptanaytical operations. During the course of the war it developed into what became called a signals intelligence (sigint) operation. Sigint is intelligence derived from the interception of communications. At its simplest it means intercepting and reading messages passed by whatever means but primarily, in the modern era, by wireless transmission. In practice, in order to secure these communications various codes and ciphers are used. Communications thus written are cryptograms; the practice of reading such communications is cryptanalysis or codebreaking; the information thus derived is sigint. Even from this brief account it can be seen that there are at least three key processes at work: interception, decoding and intelligence analysis. Given that very often the messages involved will be in a foreign language (and in highly technical form, at that) we can immediately add a fourth process, between decoding and intelligence analysis, namely translation. And since the intelligence derived has to be passed to those who can make use of it a fifth process, distribution, should be added. 
By the time of WW2 ciphers had become extremely sophisticated, principally because of the development of machine (rather than ‘hand’) ciphers. The principal such machine in widespread use within Nazi Germany was ‘Enigma’, a device using a series of rotors and electrical connections to encrypt messages to be sent and to decrypt messages received (for excellent outline accounts, see Stripp, 1993; Erskine, 2000; Calvocoressi, 2001: 31-54). It is important to understand that at different times and in different places, different versions of the Enigma machine were used. Enigma presented a challenge of enormous complexity for cryptanalysis since, although varying according to which version of the machine was in use, it had on one estimate approximately 1.59 in 1020 settings (Stripp, 1993: 86). This challenge was compounded by the fact that the settings for such machines were typically changed daily.  
Even apart from machine modifications, Enigma existed in multiple variants according to the service deploying it, for example army (Heer or Army Enigma), sir force (Luftwaffe or GAF Enigma), navy (Kriegsmarine or Naval Enigma), intelligence (Abwehr Enigma) and railways (Reichsbahn Enigma). Within each of these services were a number of user groups employing different ‘keys’. There were many dozens, possibly hundreds, of different Enigma keys so Enigma is an over-arching term covering different machines, each with a number of different keys (Hamer, Sullivan and Weierud, 1998). It is therefore a misnomer to speak of ‘Enigma’ having being broken: there were multiple Enigmas, and even when a key was broken the daily setting still had to be found.  Whilst BP is now inextricably linked with the breaking of Enigma ciphers it should always be recalled that many other ciphers, including an even more complex machine cipher than Enigma, known at BP as Fish (the cipher for which the Colossus computer was developed). Moreover, it was not just German ciphers which were being ‘attacked’ and in many cases read: it was also those of other countries, in particular Italy and Japan where, respectively, the high grade cipher machine Hagelin C-38m and the super-enciphered code JN-25 were amongst the targets. 
Partly as a consequence of pre-war breakthroughs by Polish cryptanalysts (Smith, 1998: 17-19), partly because of the capture of machines and codebooks from the Germans, partly because of the genius of the BP codebreakers and partly as a result of mistakes made by operators of the Enigma machines a wartime key was indeed broken, when some messages in an Army Enigma key were read in January 1940 (Hinsley, 1993: 14). Gradually, with many difficulties and periodic interruptions, many Enigma keys were regularly read giving rise to many thousands of decrypts each day. The intelligence product thus derived (as well as that from other high grade ciphers such as Fish) came to be called Ultra or ULTRA. The details of this extraordinary story have now been told many times (see, for example, Hinsley and Stripp, 1993; Smith, 1998; Budiansky, 2000; Sebag-Montefiore, 2000; Smith and Erskine, 2001) and both space and focus preclude it being told again here.
Apart from the technical complexities of breaking Enigma and other ciphers, there are at least three other aspects of BP’s operations which should be highlighted. Firstly, and lying outside of the BP site, there was an enormous network of intercept stations (i.e. listening posts to intercept the encrypted transmissions) the product of which had to be transported securely to BP. These intercept or ‘Y stations’ were geographically dispersed around Britain and the world, and were run by a variety of bodies including army, navy, RAF, GPO and the police. Secondly, at BP itself, apart from cryptanalytic work there was an enormous amount of both translation and intelligence analysis work. The messages decoded, apart from being in German (or Italian, Japanese etc.), were typically of a highly technical character, requiring particularly skilled translation. Moreover, they typically consisted of multiple ‘snippets’ of information, the intelligence value of which could only be identified by careful analysis, comparison and cross-reference with other decrypts. This required, in turn, sophisticated information management systems, principally in the form of indexes in order to create useable intelligence outputs. These outputs then needed to be securely distributed to users or ‘customers’ such as government ministries or military commands. Thirdly, apart from cryptanalysis, a considerable amount of intelligence was derived from traffic analysis (TA), meaning the analysis of transmissions which, whilst not necessarily decoded, revealed information about, for example, the location and concentration of enemy of activity.
Organizationally, the ongoing breaking of Enigma was of key significance, leading to a rapid and considerable growth in personnel. The original GC & CS staff who moved to BP in 1939 numbered around 200. By 1944 almost 10,000 people worked there​[2]​, about three quarters of whom were women, mainly working in a three-shift system across 24 hours of the day. For present purposes the overall process can be summarised as follows:
	Interception of signals at numerous listening (Y) stations, run by a variety of agencies and services, located around the country and the world
	Transport or transmission of intercepts (often ‘corrupt’ i.e. with missing or incorrect segments) to BP
	Decryption of intercepts (running to thousands a day) in different ciphers (e.g. Enigma and Fish) which themselves had numerous variants or ‘keys’ (e.g. Enigma Army Vulture), each one of which, in the case of Enigma, changed settings daily. Decryption was achieved though highly complex manual, electromechanical (e.g. ‘bombes’ for Enigma) and electronic means (e.g. ‘Colossus’ for ‘Fish’)
	Emendation (i.e. ‘de-corruption’) and translation of decrypts (including highly technical terms and abbreviations) into English
	Intelligence assessment of decrypted material and traffic analysis (indexing, cross-referencing being crucial to this process)
	Secure distribution of intelligence product to customers (e.g. ministries, field commanders)
	Use in field or strategy (or not – since sometimes to have used the intelligence would have revealed its existence and thus led to the cipher being changed or abandoned)
Within BP itself, the main sections mentioned in this paper are: 
	Hut 3 (translation, evaluation and distribution of army and air force Enigma decrypts)
	Hut 6 (decryption of army and air force Enigma) 
	Hut 4 (translation, evaluation and distribution of naval Enigma decrypts; and decryption, translation, evaluation and distribution of all non-Enigma naval ciphers) 
	Hut 8 (decryption of naval Enigma)
The key thing for the purposes of this paper is that all of these operations were conducted in conditions of the most stringent secrecy, because were there to be any hint that Enigma was successfully being read it would lead to its modification or abandonment by German forces. Moreover, the various operations described here were highly compartmentalised, so that as well as maintaining secrecy from the outside world there was an elaborate system of internal secrecy as well. It is this secrecy with which the present paper is concerned.
A Culture of Secrecy
Many kinds of wartime service entailed discretion and there was a general imprecation to the population that ‘careless talk costs lives’. This was intended to discourage, for example, civilians discussing details of air raids, or service people mentioning troop movements or other potentially sensitive information. However, this general wartime culture was as nothing compared to BP, which entailed a degree of secrecy that was almost unparalleled. Even amongst intelligence-related organizations the degree of secrecy at BP was, perhaps, extreme and certainly there is no example (or none that is known!) of a greater degree of secrecy. This means that everyone who worked at BP had the experience of being required to sign the Official Secrets Act (OSA) and, more vividly, of receiving very stern instructions on the matter of secrecy. There are some stories, probably apocryphal, of new recruits being told, with a pistol on display, that security breaches would result in being shot. Slightly less dramatically ‘we were told in no uncertain terms that this [signing the OSA] was a very important thing and we would go to the Tower if we breathed a word’ (Hill, 2004: 27). What is certainly not in doubt is that every person working at BP was told on joining, and repeatedly thereafter, that they must say nothing whatsoever about their work to anyone in the outside world, including families, friends and spouses; nor must they talk about their work to people at BP beyond those they actually worked with, and not to them when outside their working area at BP. Frequent written notices and lectures continually re-enforced the fact that staff must not talk about their work at meals, in BP transports, when travelling on public transport, in lodgings, at home and even to take care within their own hut, the latter lest cleaners or maintenance staff overhear​[3]​. Staff were instructed to respond to queries from outsiders about their work with vague answers about working in an office, or for the foreign office, or, possibly, that they worked ‘in communications’, and they should not make reference to working at a place called Bletchley Park (even though, of course, at the time this name would have meant nothing to most people). Special arrangements were made for postal deliveries, telegrams, telephone calls and rail warrants so that it would not become obvious that there was (as the years went by) a huge concentration of personnel working at this one site. 
Although they were not necessarily aware of it, everyone who worked at BP had security checks made upon them, in many cases leading to short delays between being appointed and actually taking up duties. These checks would relate to general issues of trustworthiness as well as to vulnerabilities to blackmail and political sympathies. It has proved impossible to gather any significant level of detail on these practices. Hayward (1993: 182) recounts being ‘subjected to the full positive-vetting [that is, not just background checks but detailed examination of a person’s past conduct, associates, political affiliations etc.] procedure’ on joining BP although also reports being informally inducted to save time, given the two week delay in getting formal clearance, so there was some flexibility in play. A further glimpse is provided by the comment of Dora, an interviewee who worked in administration and saw some of the paperwork relating to this: ‘I can remember there was somebody who had a record that he went out to Spain and he’d been fighting the Spanish Civil War … he was under suspicion’. More generally she recalls that in the administration office there were files on each employee ‘and they were fairly penetrating as to who you were and where you’d come from and what you’d done. They knew about you, plus your clearance’. The extent of the knowledge gained was considerable, as one staff member discovered when accidentally seeing a file on a colleague: ‘I simply couldn’t credit the extraneous detail of this girl’s life that was contained in the dossier – concerning her parents, her extended family and even her friends. It sticks in my mind that her grandmother had once had an affair with a Turk!’ (Unnamed ATS officer, quoted in Hill, 2004: 61). This extensive checking process also lead to what for some was the disconcerting experience of finding, on arrival at BP, that one was already ‘known’. For example, the interviewee Joyce found that ‘[my boss] knew the names of some of my teachers and what subjects I was good at’ (cf. Hill, 2004: 19). By contrast, no one arriving at BP knew any details whatsoever of the work for which they had been recruited.
All of the many published accounts of life at BP provide numerous illustrations of the strength of the culture of secrecy but a few cases from the interviews for this study will serve to illustrate the point. For example Daphne recalled that ‘my sister worked in Hut 10 … I’ve no idea what she did, she never told’ (and nor did Daphne tell her sister what she herself did); Vera remarked ‘it was so impressed upon us that we’d got to keep this secret and we must never, never, never tell it’. Neither Daphne nor Vera were ‘enwised’ – which is to say they had not been indoctrinated into the fact of Enigma (or other ciphers) having been broken – whereas Joyce, because of her assessing work in Hut 3, was. She recalled not just the instruction that this secret must never be told but also it being burdensome ‘knowing this terrible secret’. Others who worked at BP have described the strain that working in secret imposed, for example ‘I used to be terrified that I would say something in my sleep. There were women who refused operations in case they said something under anaesthetic’ (Hill, 2004: 130). One revealing story concerns a BP worker who became ill when on leave prompting her doctor, suspecting a work-related cause, to write to chief administrator Commander Bradshaw stating ‘[she] has hypertrophy of the conscience to such an extent that she will not divulge the smallest detail of what she does, even though it is against her own interests. As I find it difficult to believe that this young girl is on work which is so important … I thought I would write to ask …’ (McKay, 2010: 103-104).
Alongside a culture of ‘not telling’, the other element of secrecy was ‘not asking’. All of the interviewees just quoted, and many other published accounts of life at BP, emphasise this element. No doubt it again relates in part to wider wartime strictures about careless talk. In the words of Vera (a Wren clerical worker): 
This is what I find astonishing, is my lack of curiosity. It’s something to do with wartime, being brought up in a very Naval family, my father as away at sea, my brothers were away at sea, that was part of our lives. You didn’t talk about where ships were … You’d go out with your friends in London, you just simply didn’t ask them where they were going … 
The general point is the way that secrecy was linked not just to discretion but to lack of curiosity. But, as noted briefly above, at BP there was a very significant additional element to this, the extremely rigid compartmentalization of work and restriction of information on a ‘need to know’ basis and it is vital to grasp here how central it was to BP. To give one of many examples: 
It was a very curious organisation. We were very, very departmentalised [sic]. You never discussed your work with anyone except your little group you worked with. I hadn’t a clue what was going on in the rest of the Park and nobody else had a clue what we were doing (Susan Wenham, Hut 6, quoted in Smith, 1998: 37).
A nice illustration of compartmentalization is provided by Ron, interviewed for this study. He came to BP from the Post Office to work as an engineer on the teleprinters used to handle Fish decrypts. Throughout the war and until the 1970s he thought that BP was simply a communications station, and that the only secret, sigint aspect of the site was his section: ‘I thought it was a brilliant idea, to bury this little unit amongst thousands of others working on communications’. In a similar way, Naval Section recruit James Hogarth ‘… never really understood the BP organization – I imagine very few people did – and I never met the head of the whole organization’ (Hogarth, 2008: 25). This again was commonplace: those joining BP were given no induction into its overall scope and purposes, only, at most, those of the particular section or sub-section where they worked or perhaps just their individual task within that.
To re-emphasise, it is absolutely crucial to understanding the secrecy culture at BP to recognize the nature and extent of this compartmentalization. It meant that the majority, probably the overwhelming majority, of those who worked there did not know the reality of what they were working on. Ron, just quoted, at least was enwised to Fish being read. Amongst the much larger number of people working in some way on Enigma and other ciphers only a minority were enwised and, although others certainly guessed that Enigma was being broken, many did not even realise that they were engaged in a codebreaking operation at all, or only in the haziest way. For example, for many all they were aware of was their own tiny, perhaps clerical, task: what they were actually filing and indexing they did not necessarily know or, even if they knew, they had no idea where the material came from or what it meant – although they did know that what little they were aware of must never be spoken of.  Thus the secrecy at BP was not just a secrecy from the outside world but also an internal secrecy. Many who worked at BP died not knowing what work they had been involved in. Some who lived long enough had the no doubt extraordinary experience in 1974 of learning the truth (or some of it, since the full details emerged over a period of years).
The extreme secrecy at BP extended beyond vetting, constant reminders of security and rigid compartmentalization. Security officers also frequented public places in the area around Bletchley Park – staff were billeted in towns and villages for many miles around - checking for any signs of security breaches. An extract from one of these reports, from security officer James Bellinger on 23 March 1941, can serve to illustrate their nature, as well as making interesting reading in itself:
During the course of my investigation I have visited nearly every hotel, public house and club in Bletchley and the surrounding districts … I do not believe that any information as to the nature of the duties undertaken [at BP] has been imparted to [local residents]. The greater majority are very patriotic and [are] satisfied that whatever is done is all for the good of the country. There are some however who have a different idea and refer to the civil employees as persons who have dodged out of London, either to avoid the air raids or being called upon for military service. On the other hand there are a few people who have a shrewd idea as to what may be going on, by referring to some of the employees as Doctors of Science, Mathematicians and Professors from various Universities who are undertaking work of great national importance … [Others, specifically women] have a lot to say as to the way that some of our young ladies dress for business; I suppose it is a natural topic with women. Nevertheless at 9.15 am on the mornings [sic] of 19th, 20th and 21st March 1941 I have seen a young married woman leaving the Park, coming off night duty, dressed as if she had just left a Turkish Harem​[4]​
There are several points of interest here, including issues relating to gender and the fact that some ‘shrewd’ guesses were made by the public (and, in fact, very often by family members) as to the nature of the work being done by BP staff. However, the point I want to highlight is how the very strong secrecy culture at BP had three elements. One was about ignorance – not knowing what was going on beyond one’s immediate work; one was about silence – not speaking to anyone at all about any aspect of one’s work; one, as the quoted extract illustrates, was about surveillance – vetting checks and ongoing monitoring of behaviour.
Despite the quite remarkable strength of the secrecy culture at BP, there were throughout the war a string of minor security breaches. It would be a daunting task to document these but throughout the TNA HW 14 sequence of directorate related papers there are numerous references to lapses and injunctions to staff to recall the strict rules in place: ‘month after month instances have occurred where workers at BP have been found casually saying things outside BP which are dangerous’​[5]​. Most of these cases were relatively trivial and many seem to have been to do with individuals explaining, or perhaps boasting, that they were doing work of importance. It is easy to understand why this might have been a temptation, especially for civilians who might be viewed with the kind of disdain implied in the security officer’s report just quoted (cf. McKay, 2010: 220). Indeed in this way the more general culture of war cut in two directions: on the one hand discouraging ‘careless talk’, on the other putting considerable pressure on individuals to be seen to be ‘doing their bit’ – an example of the way that such culture was neither homogenous nor uncontradictory. Even a very senior person at BP, Gordon Welchman, broke the security rules by telling his father something of his work (Hill, 2004: 80). Nevertheless, there is no evidence of any significant security breach at BP - although there is one account of a ‘spy’ being taken off the premises by ‘two burly MI5 men’ (Hill, 2004: 52) - and no suggestion whatsoever that the Axis powers ever breached BP security. A different question is how much of BP’s work was known to the Soviet Union, since John Cairncross, the Soviet agent, worked there for a period (Aldrich 2010: 36-7; Smith, 1998: 155-6). However, this was not a matter of ‘careless talk’ but of purposeful espionage, and does not in itself undermine the wider point about a culture of secrecy.
What is perhaps the most striking feature of the secrecy culture at BP is the way that it persisted for so long after the war which is remarkable considering the number of people who worked there. It is straining credulity to think that no one subsequently told any family member of their work but there are many cases which have emerged since BP became public knowledge of how silence was kept within families. Particularly delicious are those cases where spouses both worked at BP but never told each other, for example: 
My husband John and I had been married for 30 years or more when one spring we visited a stately home …. The magnolia trees were in full bloom. John said, “there were two such lovely magnolias where I was stationed for a time during the war’. ‘Oh’ said I, ‘I knew two such trees too – beside a lake’. ‘Really,’ said John – same lake, same magnolias at Bletchley Park. In all those years we had kept the secret from one another!! (Joan Unwin, Wren, quoted in Page 2002: 70-71). 
Such stories and the very fact of the silence that was maintained are a testament to the centrality and solidity of secrecy in BP culture and, in fact, many who worked there will still not speak of it. Indeed, even amongst those agreeing to be interviewed for this study there was sometimes evident a residual sense of reluctance, even guilt, about speaking, so strong was the injunction to silence (cf. Hill, 2004: 48). 
The process through which the BP story came into the public domain is itself an interesting and complex one, which can only be very briefly outlined here (see Moran, 2012 for a detailed account). The original reasons for keeping it secret were, firstly, that it was still operationally relevant to post-war sigint techniques (Kahn, 2010) and, secondly, to avoid any suggestion in post-war Germany that the Nazis had not been beaten by ‘legitimate’ military means. The fear was of a belief developing, analogous to the ‘stab in the back’ belief that followed Germany’s defeat in WW1, that defeat had been based on trickery (Herman, 2007: 2)​[6]​. By the 1960s this latter concern had become irrelevant, although the former was held to still have some, albeit diminishing, purchase. But bit by bit the secret was leaking out through various more or less oblique references in published books in English, French and Polish (Herman, 2007: 3-5; Thirsk, 2008: 61-68). At the same time, it had been decided in 1969 that there would be some form of official history of British intelligence in WW2, and it was difficult to see how such a history could realistically exclude the Ultra secret. It was against this background that Winterbotham published his 1974 book with the tacit, albeit ambiguous, agreement of the authorities (Herman, 2007: 7). This book’s publication, and its serialization in the Sunday Telegraph, provoked massive public interest. Although it did not by any means tell the whole story of BP, and in some respects was inaccurate in what it did say, it led to further revelations and, eventually, near complete declassification of official documents. Meanwhile, despite some ongoing political machinations, the magisterial official history was being prepared under the leadership of former BP luminary and Cambridge historian Professor Sir Harry Hinsley, with the first volume being published in 1979. Four subsequent volumes appeared over the next decade, despite some considerable delays caused by opposition from the then Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, culminating in an abridged edition summarising the series (Hinsley, 1993).
Whilst this process of disclosure is not directly relevant to the present analysis, it is indicative of  how entrenched was the culture of secrecy surrounding BP. Winterbotham ‘was violently criticized by former colleagues as the man who had let the side down’ (Herman, 2007: 7) although it will be clear even from the brief account I have given that disclosure was happening anyway, and would almost certainly have continued to do so. Many BP veterans interviewed or otherwise supplying information for this study spoke very negatively about Winterbotham’s book having been published, more than thirty years after the event, again showing how far-reaching was the culture of secrecy. 
There are many parallels to this situation, especially where lifetime prohibitions on secrecy are violated. For example, Sontag & Drew (1998) provoked considerable controversy in revealing details of US submarine espionage during the Cold War. The question of when a secret ‘no longer matters’ is by no means a clearcut one, and may be subject to a variety of interpretations by different actors including the state, the judiciary and those who lived under, and adhered to, injunctions of secrecy (see Moran, 2012). This is well-illustrated by the convoluted history of the British government’s ultimately unsuccessful attempts to suppress publication of Peter Wright’s (1987) memoirs of his time as an MI5 office (see Andrew, 2009: 760-765). As I will discuss in the next section, the keeping of secrets is not necessarily a matter of rationality or functional necessity and it may be that the keeping of secrets becomes a culturally ingrained habit. For example, it seems almost extraordinary now that as recently as the late 1980s the British government did not officially acknowledge the very existence of its security and intelligence agencies. A more contemporary example might be the very considerable lengths that the US government has gone to to suppress the Wikileaks disclosures. Yet it is striking that many of these, for example those concerning the Iraq war, Russian corruption or Arabian disapproval of the Iranian regime, really only confirmed what was already widely known. Indeed it has been argued that “[t]he only surprising thing about the WikiLeaks revelations is that they contain no surprises.” (Zizek, 2011). 
Implications
Although secrecy can take a number of forms within organizations (Feldman, 1988; Costas & Grey, 2011), the BP case conforms to a standard definition of secrecy as that which ‘intentionally conceals knowledge, information and/or behaviour from the view of others’ (Bok, 1984: 5-6) in order ‘to protect an informational asset perceived to be of high value – whether tactical or strategic’ (Dufresne and Offstein, 2008: 103). This precisely describes the situation at BP where secrecy had a clear and very high value of this sort. However, it does not follow that secrecy is simply a matter of concealment for rational or functional reasons. Indeed this is recognized by Max Weber (1978) in his classic account of bureaucracy: “the concept of the “official secret” is the specific invention of bureaucracy, and few things it defends so fanatically as this attitude which ... cannot be justified with purely functional arguments” (Weber, 1978: 992, emphasis added). Moreover, the protection of secrets has effects above and beyond the obvious one of concealing information from outsider. At the heart of Georg Simmel’s seminal sociological treatment of secrecy is the observation that:
Not quite so evident are the attractions and values of the secret beyond its significance as a mere means – the peculiar attraction of formally secretive behaviour irrespective of its momentary content. In the first place, the strongly emphasized exclusion of all outsiders makes for a correspondingly strong feeling of possession …. [m]oreover, since the others are excluded from the possession … the converse suggests itself psychologically, namely that what is denied to many must have special value. (Simmel, 1906: 442)
Michael Herman, mentioned above, subsequently became a leading scholar in the intelligence studies field. Drawing explicitly upon Simmel he points out that the very existence of strict secrecy bestows upon intelligence practitioners a feeling of ‘specialness’ into which newcomers are inducted through special rituals, secret language and elaborate precautions. In this way, he suggests that a deeply ingrained and lifelong sense of being a member of a privileged inner circle develops (Herman, 1996: 328-330). Simmel’s insight also appears in various observations by organizational theorists of how secrecy can be central to the formation of group identities (e.g. Dalton, 1959; Feldman, 1988; Jackall, 1988; Schein, 2010).
This is not to say that BP staff felt particularly special in the sense of ‘important’. After all, many were doing mundane jobs whose true nature they did not know, and at a time when their peers were sometimes engaged in far more ‘glamorous’ activities. Nevertheless, all seem to have been permanently ‘marked’ by secrecy and a sense of standing in contrast to ‘outsiders’. More specifically, Calvocoressi (2001: 23) uses the term the ‘Ultra community’ to refer to the Enigma-enwised and makes a very revealing comment: ‘The Ultra community at BP saw itself as – perhaps was – an elite within an elite’. This is significant for two reasons. Firstly, it points to a specific way in which, as in Simmel’s theorization, secrecy has the effect of creating feelings of ‘specialness’ amongst those in the know. That seems to be very much the sense conveyed by Calvocoressi and, in relation to being indoctrinated into the D-Day secret, a BP veteran informally interviewed at a reunion recounted how, precisely, ‘special’ she felt coming off duty the day before D-Day and knowing as she returned to her billet that she, unlike her hosts, knew what was to happen. Secondly, and of course related, is the notion of a conscious knowledge of and identification with a group (it saw itself as an elite). This is a commonplace of any kind of cultural analysis since it is a large part of what culture means.
To a large extent because of the stringencies of secrecy, the existence of an Ultra community within BP had the effect of creating what Calvocoressi (2001: 81-84) describes as a series of ‘concentric circles’, the innermost being Hut 3 along with Hut 6 and the Naval Section, the next being BP itself and the third being life outside in billets (i.e. accommodation). This, of course, is all of a piece with the more general point about how secrecy creates in and out groups, but there are some important points to note about it. Firstly, these concentric circles do not apply in this form across BP. For example, Calvocoressi’s equivalent in Hut 4 would have positioned that and Hut 8 as being the central circle; someone in Hut 6 would include SIXTA (the traffic analysis section) and so on. Thus we should envisage a multiple series of concentric circles across BP. Secondly, it should be noted that these circles are not identical with, although they relate to, work sections (i.e., in this case, the central circle is not simply Hut 3). So, alongside the general Simmelian idea of secrecy creating in and out groups, the internal compartmentalization at BP meant that a series of in and out groups were created. Only a very few people, at the top of the organization, would have had anything like membership of all of these groups.
There is another consequence of a secrecy culture, though, which is worth mentioning: it can become an end in itself. Thus ‘in practice, peacetime secrecy is often overdone; special codewords and limited distributions become departments’ badges and means of protecting and extending their territory’ (Herman, 1996: 93). BP was not, of course, a peacetime situation but even so there are some indications of this. In a general way, mirroring Herman’s point, Commander Malcolm Saunders, head of Hut 3 until 1942 remarked ‘I have often noticed with men in secret positions that they tend to project their secrecy into realms where it should not exist’​[7]​. To take some more specific consequences, Hill (2004: 57) gives the example of a technician leaving Hut 3 for a few minutes to get a spare part and being refused re-admittance since he had left his pass in the hut: ‘The hapless engineer pointed to the badge on his coat hanging on the chair, but [the officer] still refused’. This is perhaps a fairly trivial example but of more significance is this, from the internal history of Hut 3:
It was laid down (fortunately the rule was never strictly obeyed) that Hut 3 workers were not allowed to discuss their work with Hut 6 workers, nor to have direct access to the Hut 6 Decoding Room. In practice it was always of great importance that members of Hut 3 Watch should be able to take corrupt decodes personally to the decoders, a procedure which naturally gave better results than the contacts at third-hand via official channels​[8]​
Examples such as this point to the way that, for all that secrecy may serve an obvious functional purpose in terms of the protection of valuable information, it can also create problems for organizational functioning. At BP this was especially obvious in the way that compartmentalization of different operations could on occasion hamper progress. The picture here is mixed and quite complicated.
On the one hand, the relative centralization of expertise on one site at BP did allow for more knowledge sharing than occurred in, for example, either the equivalent German or American operations (Ratcliff, 2006). As an illustration of how this might work, consider one of the most basic tools of cryptanalysis: a ‘crib’. This refers to a message which has been decrypted in one cipher or cipher key but which has also been transmitted in an as yet unbroken cipher or key and can therefore be used as a way of deciphering both that message and others in the second cipher or key. The possibility of a crib meant that it was vital to apply knowledge gained in working on one cipher or cipher key to the analysis of another. This was indeed a very common method at BP because identical messages were often transmitted in a variety of different Enigma keys and/or in different ciphers. Thus if one of these keys or ciphers was broken then it became possible, or at least easier, to break another. This also meant that success against so called low grade ciphers could be vital to breaking high grade ciphers such as Enigma. 
In particular, breaking weather ciphers was of critical importance (see e.g. Erskine, 1988; Ratcliff, 2006: 94-5). Weather reports were transmitted in various ciphers and keys and, moreover, often used standardised language, making guesses of possible cribs easier. If a weather report was broken then it could be used as a crib to break another encipherment of that same report. Indeed, it was precisely this method which allowed Hut 8 to end the blackout of the Naval Enigma Shark key (of great importance as it was used by German U-boats in their attacks upon Allied shipping convoys), as noted in the diary of George McVittie, head of the Meteorological section:
13 December 1942. Big day today for the [Meteorological section]. After many months the naval Enigma with four wheels solved (broken) today by our DAN cribs. Congratulations all round from [Shaun] Wylie and from Travis who remarked that this would never have been achieved if we had worked in separate compartments like the Americans​[9]​.
But the tension between this need to share knowledge and the culture of secrecy was an ongoing one (see Grey & Sturdy, 2009 for more detail on issues of knowledge management). Some at BP, such as one of its leading cryptanalysts Dilly Knox, lamented the effects of excessive internal secrecy (Erskine, 2001a: xii). Edward Simpson headed the JN-25 working party at BP yet did not know either at the time or for many years thereafter that another group, under Hugh Foss and subsequently Geoffrey Wall in Hut 7, was working on JN-25 variants. Indeed, Simpson had no interchange with the party working on JN-11, a cipher presenting related problems to those of JN-25, even though it was based on the same corridor at BP, whilst he had no direct communication with the GC & CS outstation in Colombo, Ceylon also working on Japanese Naval ciphers. In fact, by virtue of routine exchanges on some technical matters Washington felt closer than GC & CS Colombo to Simpson​[10]​.

Another example comes from Hugh Alexander’s internal history of Hut 8, where he describes ‘an episode in the history of the section over which even the least sensitive of us would gladly draw a veil of considerable opacity’. In 1942, a group in Hut 8 working on a particular form of Mediterranean Naval traffic was having no success ‘until someone from Hut 6 … having a casual look round pointed out’ that it was an old system the solution to which was already known. Alexander records that had they had this information earlier ‘we could certainly have been reading it for some months, possibly since 1941’​[11]​. Such examples all seem to be unintended consequences of the encultured, default position of secrecy. This point is taken up by Erskine (2010: xii-xiii) in articulating the key paradox of ‘need to know’ as a basis for security: how can you know in advance who needs to know what? Although attempts were made at BP to resolve this – especially the creation of a section to co-ordinate cryptanalytic advances - its essentially paradoxical nature means that no ultimate resolution is possible.
Conclusion
In this paper I have sought to use the case of BP to illustrate some of the key processes and consequences of organizational secrecy. In summary, key processes are ignorance (only knowing what you need to know), silence (not speaking of what you do know) and surveillance (organizational checking that silence is being observed). Key consequences are the protection of valuable informational assets, the potential formation of in and out groups, excessive secrecy beyond that which is actually necessary to protect information, and the tension between secrecy and knowledge-sharing.
Given the constraints of a single paper, only a small selection of possible examples from the case have been given. Nevertheless, they hopefully provide at least a flavour of that case. It may of course be questioned how generally applicable these examples are. After all, the context of BP is a very specific one: few organizations have exhibited such secrecy. Nevertheless, it is possible to find parallel cases, most obviously amongst other state military and intelligence agencies, especially during wartime. An obvious example is the Manhattan Project to develop the US atomic bomb during WW2 (see Rhodes, 1986 for a detailed account of this project). Here, too, to stereotype both it and BP, a group of often young, often highly educated staff worked in a secret and compartmentalized organization in a remote location (or locations), doing a wide variety of work tasks and doing so in concert with a range of military and commercial agencies. One significant difference, perhaps, is that the Manhattan Project occurred within the organizational infrastructure of the US Army Corps of Engineers, with very clear lines of command (Norris, 2008: 3). This contrasts with the much more chaotic and anarchic situation at BP caused, in part, by the multiplicity of agencies involved (Grey & Sturdy, 2010). 
Organizational secrecy may also be found in commercial organizations working on military projects. One documented case, that of the development of the Stealth fighter plane at Lockheed, shows not just the role of centralization but also the centrality of surveillance: ‘We were monitored unceasingly. Towards the end of the stealth project I had nearly forty auditors living with me inside our plant, watching every move we made …’ (Rich & Janos, 1994: 79). This example is indicative of another potential disadvantage of organizational secrecy along with the dilemma of knowledge-sharing referred to earlier. For the creation of such intensive monitoring entails considerable costs in the form of what Rich & Janos (1994: 80) describe as a ‘Kafkaesque bureaucracy’.
Even beyond these kinds of state military and intelligence projects, similar organizational practices to those at BP may be found, for example in commercial R&D. Such examples offer parallels to BP because they also, albeit for commercial rather than military reasons, seek to protect high-value informational assets. In such cases we also find compartmentalization on the basis of need to know and prohibitions on disclosing what you do know. Thus, for example, organizations of this type may require employees to sign contractual agreements not to have social interactions with competitor organizations (Zucker et al., 1996) or with specified groups within their own organization (Liebeskind, 1996) and, via non-disclosure agreements, may seek to control ex-employees from revealing their former activities (Hannah, 2005, 2007). Moreover, as at BP, such organizations may physically separate organizational activities (e.g. different research teams) so that access to particular sites is segmented (Liebeskind, 1997: 633-634).
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